China’s Choice of Analytical Models for Its Anti-Monopoly Law

Social Sciences in China

Vol. 39, No. 1, 2018


China’s Choice of Analytical Models for Its Anti-Monopoly Law



Ye Weiping


Modern analytical models for anti-monopoly laws are a core element of the application of those laws. Since the Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China was promulgated in 2008, law enforcement and judicial authorities have applied different analytical models, leading to divergent legal and regulatory outcomes as similar cases receive different verdicts. To select a suitable analytical model for China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, we need to consider the possible contribution of both economic analysis and legal formalism and to learn from the mature systems and experience of foreign countries. It is also necessary to take into account such binding constraints as the current composition of China’s anti-monopoly legal system, the ability of implementing agencies and the supply of economic analysis, in order to ensure complementarity between the analytical model chosen and the complexity of economic analysis and between the professionalism of implementing agencies and the cost of compliance for participants in economic activities. In terms of institutional design, the models should provide a considered explanation of the legislative aims of the law’s provisions. It is necessary, therefore, to establish a processing model of behavioral classification that is based on China’s national conditions, applies analytical models using normative comprehensive analysis, makes use of the distribution rule of burden of proof, improves supporting systems related to analytical models and enhances the ability of public authorities to implement the law.


Keywords: anti-monopoly, anti-monopoly law analytical models, economic analysis, legal formalism, unity of the legal system