On April 22, the launch event for the Haidian District New Employment Groups Service Program was held at the Zhongguancun National Independent Innovation Demonstration Zone. The service program aims to enhance the sense of fulfillment for new employment groups in areas such as healthcare, food, housing, transportation, rights protection, career development, and social integration. Photo: IC PHOTO

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Amid the ongoing technological revolution and industrial transformation, the platform economy has continued to grow, even in the face of global economic headwinds. Its rapid expansion has drawn a substantial labor force into platform-based enterprises. Surveys of platform workers show that their primary reason for entering the sector is the perceived work flexibility, followed by factors such as low entry barriers, timely payment, and comparatively high income. Platform companies themselves actively promote ideals of freedom, flexibility, and elasticity to attract and retain workers. But how do platforms actually organize and manage this vast number of ostensibly “free” laborers? How do they extract value from workers during the labor process? Is the freedom they advertise truly real? Beyond the act of production itself, can workers really enjoy flexible start times and autonomous off-hours? How do platforms manage workers’ time, maintain “stickiness,” and keep workers as continuously “online” as possible?

This article seeks to address these questions based on comprehensive fieldwork with ride-hailing workers from the Feichi platform and food delivery workers from the Jifeng platform in Beichuan City, Nanshi City, and Caiyun County (all place and platform names are pseudonyms in accordance with academic convention). While existing research has offered rich and thorough insights into labor control and work processes during working hours on such platforms, this study focuses on the length of platform labor time—specifically, the span between when a worker logs in to accept orders (“online”) and when they log off and stop working (“offline”).

Enhancing ‘labor stickiness’ through performance assessment and incentives

Recent studies have shown that platform gig work increasingly exhibits characteristics of “sticky labor.” In the face of persistent labor shortages, companies seek to stabilize their workforce by encouraging workers to maintain consistent working hours. To ensure a steady supply of labor and minimize unclaimed orders, platforms implement performance evaluation systems that directly link incentives and penalties to worker behavior—allowing them to exert more effective control over labor time.

On the Jifeng food delivery platform, both routine and emergency performance assessments are used to monitor site-level performance. In special cases, managers are tasked with rapidly mobilizing riders, pressuring them to log in and accept orders. Meanwhile, Feichi’s ride-hailing platform organizes drivers into teams led by designated captains. These team leaders manage daily tasks in online work groups, sharing order updates, regulatory alerts, and casual chat. They also publish daily earnings rankings and closely monitor drivers’ online hours. Toward the end of each month, team leaders may repeatedly tag or call out drivers who are falling short of their expected hours. Rather than directly ordering them to log on, they apply social pressure. These nudges pressure workers to reduce rest time and meet their monthly online activity goals.

Unpaid meetings and training sessions held outside of working hours are another method platforms use to control workers’ time. Third-party companies play a critical role in this process by helping platforms cut costs and enhance efficiency. As authorized agents aligned with platform interests, third-party companies act as managerial enforcers of platform rules. They oversee workers’ daily operations and training—such as regular meetings, pre-employment training, and the assignment of promotional tasks. These forms of management and training are typically unpaid and take place outside standard working hours, constituting another key mechanism through which platforms exert control over workers’ time.

Both Feichi and Jifeng platforms organize such sessions regularly. Feichi conducts quarterly or ad hoc meetings, usually in response to local issues, with logistical support from car rental partners. Notifications are sent through text messages and platform apps. Drivers holding both the online ride-hailing license and the transport license are required to attend or risk account suspension. Those with only one license may opt out. Jifeng, by contrast, requires full-time delivery workers to attend daily and weekly meetings, while part-time (crowdsourced) riders can choose whether or not to join. Full-time riders who skip these sessions are fined.

These meetings and training sessions are designed to familiarize workers with platform rules and workflows. Even though workers are technically offline during these activities, they are still contributing to the company’s operations. Many drivers and couriers have grown used to frequent meetings and consider them part of the job. Others find them time-consuming and unproductive. In addition to meetings, workers on the Jifeng platform are often required to complete monthly promotional tasks—also unpaid.

The notion of flexible working hours creates an illusion of autonomy, even as it provides platforms with leverage to subtly lengthen labor time. Platforms sort workers into various tiers based on specific criteria, and these classifications directly affect workers’ earnings. Through embedded and pervasive incentive mechanisms, workers are encouraged—or pressured—to adjust the boundaries of their work schedules and participate in various performance competitions, thereby extending their working hours. 

On the Feichi platform, a key metric known as the reputation score determines a driver’s classification within a flexible tiering system. The platform also monitors driver activity to automatically label them as full-time or part-time. Both Feichi and Jifeng facilitate performance competitions among small teams. According to interviews, once team interests are tied to individual performance, peer pressure intensifies, motivating workers to put in longer hours. Through these subtle yet powerful mechanisms, platforms quietly expand the temporal boundaries of labor—without resorting to explicit coercion.

Controlling labor time through direct and indirect mechanisms

As the preceding analysis demonstrates, both ride-hailing and food delivery platforms exert control over workers’ labor time through mechanisms such as performance evaluations, fragmented task embedding, and incentive-based management systems. However, their approaches differ significantly depending on platform type.

In terms of performance evaluation, food delivery platforms tend to employ more rigorous assessment mechanisms. Ride-hailing platforms primarily manage drivers’ working hours during peak periods but impose less pressure overall—drivers retain relative autonomy in choosing when to go online and how long to work. In contrast, food delivery platforms track a wider array of performance indicators—daily online hours, order volumes, and even the availability of couriers during rest periods in special circumstances.

Fragmented work embedding is also more prominent in food delivery platforms. Compared with food delivery, ride-hailing platforms show weaker control in this area, with fewer embedded tasks and less frequent management activities (such as meetings and training), most of which are either voluntary or held periodically. In contrast, food delivery platforms frequently embed non-core tasks into off-hours through frequent meetings and training. 

Time control mechanisms also diverge when it comes to incentives. Ride-hailing platforms rely more on built-in, gamified incentives, including points, tiered rankings, and team competitions, to encourage longer work hours. Food delivery platforms do use rankings—especially at the station or team level—but their systems are generally flatter and exert less motivational force. While top performers may receive significant rewards, many delivery workers see them as unattainable. As a result, food delivery platforms rely more heavily on direct performance evaluation to regulate labor time, whereas ride-hailing platforms influence drivers indirectly through systematized incentives.

These differences reflect each platform’s underlying labor organization model and the varying degrees of dependence among workers. Food couriers typically operate within fixed delivery zones and are organized into physical stations, where station and team leaders exercise direct management and supervision—resulting in higher controllability. Ride-hailing drivers, by contrast, operate across broader geographic areas, with lower levels of organization and more dispersed work schedules, limiting the platform’s capacity for direct supervision. 

Socioeconomic distinctions between the two groups also shape time-control strategies. Ride-hailing drivers are more likely to own their vehicles and therefore tend to be less financially dependent on the platform. This weaker dependence reduces the platform’s ability to exert direct pressure, compelling it instead to influence behavior through incentive structures—encouraging drivers to log on at high-demand times and participate in system-based competition.

Stronger labor protection required for healthy platform economy

Our interviews reveal that digital technologies play a leading role in controlling the labor process, echoing current scholarly consensus. Specifically, when it comes to extending labor time, platforms primarily rely on organizational structures and management systems, supplemented by certain information and communication technologies. Platform workers have yet to experience genuine flexibility regarding their work schedule, nor can they attain full freedom simply by going offline. While workers appear to enjoy some autonomy over when they log in and in which regions they operate, this flexibility is sometimes limited by multiple layers of platform control. Online hours can be extended, work intensity increased, and even during “offline” periods, workers may be passively drawn into unpaid tasks or compliance activities. To strengthen labor protections, foster stable labor relations, and support the healthy development of the platform economy, it is essential to prevent excessive working hours and protect workers’ right to rest from undue interference.

Zhuang Jiachi (associate professor) and Luo Shan are from the School of Sociology and Psychology at Central University of Finance and Economics. Ren Yuzhuo is from the School of Economics at Renmin University of China.

Edited by WANG YOURAN